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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Report submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

In order to promote the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the important region of the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which were supported by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty and generally referred to in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran reports the following:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran first initiated the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important disarmament measure in the region of the Middle East in 1974, which was followed by the resolution of the General Assembly. Since 1980, the Assembly has annually adopted, by consensus, a resolution on this issue. Continuous adoption of such a resolution by the Assembly is a manifestation of the global support for the promotion of peace, security and stability in the Middle East through the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

Israeli nuclear-weapon programme: the main obstacle to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region

2. As a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to its international undertakings and believes that this international instrument is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Universal adherence to this Treaty, in particular in the region of the Middle East, would effectively ensure the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Currently, the Zionist regime is the only non-party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region. Despite repeated calls by the international community, as demonstrated in the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and related

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resolutions of the General Assembly as well as of those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Zionist regime, confident of the political and military support of the United States of America, has neither acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor placed its unwarranted nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards. It has not even declared its intention to accede to the Treaty. This regime's nuclear-weapon activities, supported by the United States, seriously threaten both regional and international peace and security and endanger the non-proliferation regime.

3. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Owing to the significant provisions of that resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other States in the region duly consider that the resolution should be swiftly implemented, especially by its sponsors, namely, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

4. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East". Unconditional adherence by the Zionist regime to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and conclusion of a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA would undoubtedly lead to the early realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Neglecting the commitments by States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as enshrined in this important resolution, can only embolden that regime to continue to remain a source of threats and instability in the Middle East by flouting the aspirations of the international community and remaining outside the fold of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the full-scope safeguards regime. In this context, we believe that national reports that do not address the negative implications of the Zionist regime's intransigence with respect to joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are not as effective as they ought to be with regard to the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

5. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in implementing its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and specifically articles II and III of the Treaty, reaffirms that all its nuclear facilities are devoted to peaceful purposes and are under the full-scope safeguards of IAEA. Furthermore, contributing to the realization of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The high record of accession of the Islamic Republic of Iran, among the Middle East countries, to the non-proliferation and disarmament instruments is not only a clear manifestation of our firm commitment to the cause of disarmament and non-proliferation, but is also evidence of our

dedicated efforts towards achieving the noble goal of the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its bilateral and multilateral dialogues with other States parties to the Treaty, has always urged their active contribution towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the firm belief that an agreed plan of action and timetable for the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, especially in the Middle East, should be a top priority in the agenda of all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in particular nuclear-weapon States. There should be greater pressure exerted on the Zionist regime to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons promptly and without conditions and to place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards so as to pave the way towards achieving the long-sought goal of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

8. Unfortunately, the policy of inaction imposed upon the Security Council over the past several decades in respect of addressing the well-documented nuclear-weapon programme implemented by the Zionist regime has provided this regime with the audacity to explicitly acknowledge possession of nuclear weapons, as was divulged by its Prime Minister in an interview with German television on 12 December 2006, in disregard of the idea of the long-sought establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Moreover, this regime's development and possession of nuclear weapons not only violate basic principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the IAEA General Conference, but also clearly defy the demands and concerns of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations and constitute a constant and obstinate disregard of the international community, which has, time and again, called on this regime to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Over and above this, the Non-Aligned Movement in New York, in its statement dated 5 February 2007, expressed its great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by the Zionist regime, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemned that regime for its action and its statement in that regard, and for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals.

9. The brutal attacks by the Israeli regime on its neighbour based on absurd excuses, the killing of civilians, including women and children in Gaza, with prohibited and devastating weapons, and the defying of any call by the international community to stop the shedding of the blood of innocent people, all demonstrate to what degree the threat of such an aggressive regime is a serious one. Needless to say how much endangerment of regional as well as international peace and security nuclear weapons in the hands of such a regime could lead to.

10. The Security Council should fulfil its Charter of the United Nations-based responsibility to address such a clear and serious threat to international peace and security and take prompt and appropriate actions accordingly. The Zionist regime is the only obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Peace and stability cannot be achieved in the Middle East while the massive nuclear arsenal of this regime continues to threaten the region and beyond.

11. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the opinion that, pending the realization of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, no country of the region must acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices on its territory or under its jurisdiction or control. Countries should refrain from actions that run counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international resolutions and documents relating to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

12. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a significant role to play in the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The 2010 Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee II to consider this issue and make concrete recommendations on urgent and practical steps for the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the relevant agreements contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Review Conference should also make recommendations on measures required to force the Zionist regime to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its unwarranted nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards so as to pave the way for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region.

13. Owing to the importance of the Middle East region and in order to strengthen the realization of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on the Parties to the Treaty as well as the agreements contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, as sponsors of the 1995 Middle East resolution, should continue to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

14. The upcoming Review Conference should also establish a standing committee to monitor the implementation of the aforementioned resolution on the Middle East as well as the agreements achieved at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in this regard and to report to the States parties to the Treaty.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chairman's statement at the conclusion of the meeting of focal points of nuclear-weapon-free zones and Mongolia

A meeting of focal points of nuclear-weapon-free zones of Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), the South Pacific (Rarotonga Treaty), South-East Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and Central Asia, as well as of Mongolia, was held on 27 and 28 April 2009 in Ulaanbaatar. The focal points discussed the implementation of the Tlatelolco declaration of 2005 as well as preparations for the follow-up Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia and for the 2010 Review Conference. Following the consideration of those issues, the Chairman is making the following statement:

1. We reaffirm the validity of the declaration of the first Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, adopted on 28 April 2005 in Mexico.

2. We reaffirm that the existence of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their use constitute a threat to the entire human race and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for it. Hence nuclear disarmament, total prohibition and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons remain urgent tasks facing humankind. We support the Secretary-General's five-point proposal to revitalize the international disarmament agenda, which includes a call for negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

3. We welcome the positive signs that are emerging to reduce further nuclear arsenals as well as the recent "surge" in various ideas and proposals to address the pending issues of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as imperatives that humankind is facing today. These positive developments and trends taken together create a positive climate in which to pursue further the goals of a world free of nuclear weapons and of nuclear non-proliferation.

4. We recognize the importance of multilateralism and in particular the notable role played by the United Nations in the area of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, and we reiterate our commitment to adopting measures to strengthen that role.

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5. We reaffirm that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains an essential instrument of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and reiterate the validity of the principles, obligations and rights contained therein, in particular in articles III, IV, VI and VII.

6. We are convinced that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements entered into freely among the States of the zone concerned promotes the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon and neighbouring States constitutes an important nuclear disarmament commitment.

7. We reiterate our concern that though almost a decade has passed since the 2000 Review Conference, uneven progress has been marked in implementing the agreed nuclear disarmament measures. Therefore we urge all States to comply with the obligations set forth in article VI of the Treaty and elaborated further in the decisions of the Review Conference mentioned above.

8. We urge nuclear-weapon States to continue taking steps towards concluding an unconditional and legally binding universal treaty on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and to honour their commitments regarding security assurances until the treaty is concluded.

9. We welcome the entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty on 21 March 2009, the first such zone in the northern hemisphere and covering an area where nuclear weapons were previously based. With more rigorous safeguards provisions, it will make an effective contribution to strengthening regional and global peace and security.

10. We are looking forward to the entry into force of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which would mark an important step towards attaining the objective of global non-proliferation.

11. We urge nuclear-weapon States and any other States listed or mentioned in the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones that have not yet signed or ratified the protocols to do so as soon as possible, and urge those that have made reservations or unilateral interpretations to modify or withdraw them.

12. We express full support for Mongolia's policy of institutionalizing its nuclear-weapon-free status. We welcome the start of the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbours to conclude the required legal instrument and express the hope that it will soon result in the conclusion of an international instrument institutionalizing the status.

13. We reiterate our support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East as well as North-East Asia, South Asia and Central Europe.

14. We reaffirm the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty and urge those States that are not parties thereto to accede to it without delay or conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. We reaffirm the commitments reflected in the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties to further promote and strengthen the zones and to cooperate in promoting ratifications, where appropriate, by all States that belong to a nuclear-weapon-free

zone as a contribution to strengthening confidence and the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and achieving nuclear disarmament.

16. We reiterate our demand for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and stress the importance of the speedy entry into force of and the achievement of universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would make a tangible practical contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament. Pending its entry into force, a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions and on any other nuclear explosions needs to be maintained.

17. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all States to develop the research, production and utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty. We further reaffirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones do not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

18. We recognize the fundamental role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application and verification of compliance with the international safeguards regime provided for in the Treaty and the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, as well as its efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the international safeguards system.

19. Bearing in mind that disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting a world free of nuclear-weapon threats, we encourage all States to promote programmes instilling the values of peace and disarmament.

20. We will continue preparations for the second Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia to be held in advance of the 2010 Review Conference. It is understood that a parallel civil society forum will also take place.

Ulaanbaatar, 28 April 2009

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Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"

Report submitted by Australia to the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underpins the international community's shared and enduring interest in realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty remains essential to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and advance the process of nuclear disarmament. Universality remains a key objective. Australia calls upon the countries yet to join the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. Australia welcomes the substantial cuts made by some nuclear-weapon States to their nuclear arsenals. Especially welcome were the stated commitments of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons and their agreement to conclude a legally binding and verifiable successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) before that treaty expires in December 2009. Australia's view is that any successor to START should contain irreversible reductions in all kinds of nuclear weapons, and a strong verification regime, and should clearly lay out a path to further disarmament. France's announcement of further cuts to its nuclear arsenal to under 300 nuclear warheads, or half the level of its cold war height, and the announcement by the United Kingdom that it had reduced its operationally available warheads to fewer than 160 weapons were also warmly welcomed by Australia.

3. Australia, however, believes that there is much more that nuclear-weapon States can do to fulfil their obligations under article VI, cognizant of the fact that this must occur in ways that buttress rather than weaken international peace and security. Nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. This includes those made at previous review conferences such as the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Australia realizes that a few of

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these steps are no longer relevant — such as those referring to START II and III — but most remain as relevant today as in 2000. Nuclear-weapon States that have not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must do so and all nuclear-weapon States should actively work towards its entry into force. In addition, all nuclear-weapon States should strive for the commencement of negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

4. Australia encourages all nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies through transparency and confidence-building measures. We also look to all nuclear-weapon States to pursue further reductions in the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems in ways that promote international stability and security, and to de-target their nuclear missiles.

5. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, Australia has contributed to nuclear disarmament by working in multilateral forums for progress on the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as through our bilateral relationships, urging nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their article VI commitments. We have also judged ourselves by the highest standards in terms of our compliance with our own non-proliferation commitments and obligations.

6. The strongest contribution Australia has made to the cause of nuclear disarmament over the last 12 months has been the establishment, with Japan, of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The Commission, an independent global panel co-chaired by former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Mr. Gareth Evans, and former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, aims to reinvigorate the global effort to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to secure further advances in nuclear disarmament. The Commission operates with strong support from both Governments but takes an independent approach. Comprised of eminent persons from across the world and supported by many of the finest minds in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the Commission has already held two highly successful meetings in Sydney and Washington, D.C. and the first of a series of regional meetings in Santiago. These meetings have produced a nascent pathway to change the formulaic and unproductive nature of much of the current international nuclear debate between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, developed and developing countries and parties and non-parties to the Treaty. Further Commission meetings are planned in the next months in Moscow and Hiroshima, Japan, and regional meetings in Beijing, Delhi and Cairo. The Commission's first major report, due by early next year, can hopefully make an important contribution to the work of the Treaty Review Conference in May 2010. The work of the Commission will continue after the Review Conference towards the end of next year, assessing and responding to progress made at the Conference and further developments.

7. Australia strongly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and we continue to urge countries yet to sign or ratify, especially annex II countries and those in the Asia-Pacific region, to do so without delay. In this context, Australia welcomed Colombia's ratification of the Treaty as an annex II State earlier this year, bringing to nine the number of additional annex II States necessary to bring the treaty into force. Australia, Mexico and New Zealand formed the core group that put forward the resolution adopted at the sixty-first session of the General Assembly, which stressed the fundamental importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban

Treaty to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and urged all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. Australia is an active participant in development of the verification system for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and welcomes the continued progress being made, especially in relation to the international monitoring system. Australia expects to host the third highest number of international monitoring system facilities (after the United States of America and the Russian Federation) in the near future.

8. Australia remains committed to negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of the Shannon mandate (CD/1299 of 1995). Negotiation of such a treaty was a recommendation of both the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. As one of the Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament in 2009, Australia is working closely with the other five presidents and members of the Conference to ensure that the Conference agrees to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty this year, within the context of an agreement on a balanced programme of work. We welcome renewed commitments to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty as a priority of the Conference and look forward to cooperative efforts by all States to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

9. In its role as one of the presidents of the 2009 session of the Conference on Disarmament, Australia is taking an active role in trying to build consensus on a practical, balanced programme of work. We urge all members of the Conference on Disarmament to put their weight behind the efforts of the 2009 Presidents to achieve a programme of work.

10. Effective non-proliferation is crucial to a climate conducive to nuclear disarmament. Compliance with non-proliferation commitments, including those under this treaty, will be crucial to achieving this climate.

Outreach and regional assistance

11. Australia regularly participates in workshops and seminars in countries of the region on agreements such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Additional Protocol. Australia is also working with countries of the region on practical outreach in key areas such as export controls, nuclear security and safeguards training, all of which support a political climate conducive to disarmament.

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by the Government of New Zealand

Article I: New Zealand views the commitment of nuclear-weapon States not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices under article I as a core component of broader nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This commitment is also important in the context of the threat of the acquisition of such items by non-State actors.

Article II: New Zealand is in full compliance with its commitments contained in article II. New Zealand's obligations under the Treaty are legislated in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987. New Zealand's concerns about compliance by other non-nuclear weapon States have been expressed in various forums, including at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and in bilateral contacts.

Article III: New Zealand has a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force with IAEA. In 2001, IAEA assessed New Zealand to be in full compliance with all its safeguards commitments. New Zealand, as a State with a Small Quantities Protocol, is supportive of the decision of IAEA to modify the Small Quantities Protocol to address weaknesses in the safeguards system identified by the Agency. New Zealand applies export controls to materials and dual-use goods which can be used in a nuclear weapons programme and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Article IV: New Zealand reaffirms the inalienable right of States parties to peaceful nuclear technology, as long as it is exercised in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. New Zealand has been active at such forums as IAEA in promoting close attention to the safe transport of radioactive materials and radioactive waste. New Zealand is concerned that there be the highest possible safety standards and that they be applied fully, that coastal and other interested States receive notification in advance of shipments and that adequate liability arrangements be in place.

Article V: New Zealand is actively engaged in efforts to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As one of the 13 practical steps agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference, entry into force of

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CTBT would constitute a significant step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. At the United Nations in 2008, New Zealand, with Australia and Mexico, was a lead sponsor of General Assembly resolution 63/87 (CTBT), in which the Assembly urged all States that have not yet done so to ratify the Treaty without delay.

New Zealand ratified CTBT in March 1999 and enacted the Treaty domestically in the Nuclear Test Ban Act 1999. A ban on nuclear testing is also included in the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty and the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987.

Article VI: With its partners in the New Agenda Coalition, New Zealand has worked hard to promote the negotiations in good faith relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. At the United Nations in 2008, New Zealand, with the New Agenda Coalition, was a lead sponsor of a resolution entitled "Towards a nuclear weapon free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments", which highlighted limited progress on many issues relating to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and called upon all States to abide fully by their commitments.

New Zealand was also pleased to promote a resolution at the United Nations in 2008, along with Chile, Malaysia, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, calling for action to lower the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems. General Assembly resolution 63/41 ("Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems") attracted a strong level of support and New Zealand will be looking to build on this solid foundation in the contexts of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United Nations.

At the Conference on Disarmament, New Zealand remains supportive of proposals for a programme of work, including on nuclear disarmament, fissile materials, negative security assurances and outer space. Commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty without preconditions would make a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Article VII: New Zealand is a staunch advocate of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in contributing to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. New Zealand is a full party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 1985 (the Treaty of Rarotonga, also enacted in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987).

The establishment of a Southern Hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free zone remains a key objective for New Zealand, which works with Brazil in the General Assembly to advance this initiative (see General Assembly resolution 63/65). We welcome the recent ratifications to the Treaty of Pelindaba, whose entry into force is essential to the realization of this initiative.

Article VIII: New Zealand supports the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as it stands. New Zealand will participate fully in the eighth Review Conference of the Treaty in 2010 and the meetings of its Preparatory Committee.

Article IX: New Zealand continues to emphasize the importance of universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, calling on India, Israel

and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article IX, as a matter of priority.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains of concern to New Zealand. New Zealand strongly supports the six party talks and hopes that this process will eventually lead the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to active membership of the Treaty, meeting its obligations under the Treaty and resuming cooperation with IAEA.

Article X: New Zealand joined the consensus decision in 1995 that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be extended indefinitely. The 1995 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a package of decisions in 1995 and all of these elements remain extant. In New Zealand's view, the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not a permit for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.

Thirteen steps

Steps 1 and 2: New Zealand ratified CTBT in March 1999, having taken an active part in its negotiation. At the General Assembly in 2008, New Zealand was a core sponsor of resolution 63/87 on CTBT, which reiterated calls for universal ratification of that Treaty. Pending ratification of the Treaty, New Zealand has been active in the establishment of the Treaty's international monitoring system.

New Zealand endorsed a joint ministerial statement on CTBT in 2008 which called upon "all States to continue a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions" pending official ratification of the Treaty. New Zealand has worked with Pacific countries to put in place the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which bans nuclear testing. Twenty years ago New Zealand also established a New Zealand nuclear-free zone with the passage of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987.

Steps 3 and 4: New Zealand actively supports the current efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to agree a programme of work that would see a negotiation commencing on a fissile material cut-off treaty and substantive discussions on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and outer space.

Step 5: New Zealand has argued, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, that irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. The New Agenda Coalition resolution to the General Assembly in 2008, resolution 63/58, reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts.

Step 6: New Zealand, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, urges States to live up to the unequivocal undertaking jointly agreed at the 2000 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference, for the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. This undertaking remains extant. New Zealand has reminded States of their obligations through various statements in the context of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The unequivocal undertaking on the part of all Treaty signatory States is a foundation on which the New Agenda Coalition continues to build.

New Zealand welcomes the widespread support demonstrated in recent years for the taking of further practical steps to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high-alert status. Reduction in deployments and the lowering of nuclear weapon systems operational status contribute to nuclear disarmament through the enhancement of confidence-building and transparency measures and reinforce a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

Steps 7 and 8: New Zealand welcomes the recent announcement by the United States of America and the Russian Federation that negotiations on a new nuclear reductions agreement are about to get under way. We urge both sides to work for a robust and ambitious agreement that contains irreversible and verifiable cuts in both strategic and non-strategic arsenals. Such an agreement would demonstrate a concrete commitment to nuclear disarmament in advance of the 2010 Review Conference.

Step 9: New Zealand supports the full range of measures outlined in this step and continues to call on all nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals, both strategic and non-strategic, and to take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, including through a reduction in the operational readiness of their nuclear weapon systems. New Zealand urges all nuclear-weapon States to be more transparent about their nuclear weapons capabilities, which would represent an effective confidence-building measure.

Step 10: New Zealand recognizes and welcomes the fact that all non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted full controls on fissile materials. These controls are verified and administered by IAEA. New Zealand urges nuclear-weapon States to adopt similar commitments in this area. New Zealand supports the early negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and welcomes efforts currently under way in the Conference on Disarmament in this regard.

Step 11: New Zealand engages in a wide range of disarmament work relating to weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Through active membership of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, New Zealand campaigns for progress towards the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand has also played a leading role in international efforts regarding certain conventional weapons, particularly in development of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was signed by 94 States in December 2008. There is close cooperation between New Zealand and Pacific neighbours on efforts to reduce and control the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. New Zealand also belongs to four major export control regimes: the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Step 12: New Zealand submitted a report to the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the eighth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which set out New Zealand's progress with regard to each article of the Treaty. The reporting mechanism outlined in step 12 is essential in promoting transparency and to build confidence about States' implementation of the Treaty.

Step 13: New Zealand has given strong support to a system of strengthened IAEA safeguards, including in regional disarmament discussions. The IAEA safeguards system is an essential component of the global non-proliferation regime. New Zealand believes that an additional protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, form the contemporary verification standard and should always feature as a condition in new supply arrangements. Universal application of the integrated safeguards system, including the additional protocols, would promote collective security. New Zealand continues to call upon those States which have not yet concluded any safeguards agreement with IAEA to do so at the earliest possible date.